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Ken GriffinHeld
Citadel Advisors · Q2 2026
$126.93K
16.99K shares · 0.0% of portfolio
Crexendo, Inc.
How the company evolved, year by year. Revenue and debt come from the annual reports — for most companies, the 10-K filings with the SEC since 2009; dividends from the payments themselves.
The bars are a balance on the closing date; the lines are what happened during the year. Revenue above equity is ordinary, not an anomaly — it means the company turns its capital over more than once a year.
Major managers that reported this stock in their latest 13F.
▲ +10.3% over 5Y.
today you would have $1,027.09▲ +2.7%
Dividends reinvested, splits accounted for. Past prices say what happened, not what will.
The last 8 closed years. Each multiple uses that year’s closing price and that year’s reported numbers — not today’s. The range is set by the annual reports on record.
| Indicator | Median | 2025 | 2024 | 2023 | 2022 | 2021 | 2020 | 2019 | 2018 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Year-end price | $6.47 | $5.23 | $4.85 | $1.90 | $5.00 | $6.93 | $4.25 | $2.00 | |
| P/E | 50.6x | 40.4x | 87.2x | — | — | — | 15.1x | 60.7x | — |
| P/S | 2.7x | 3.0x | 2.4x | 2.4x | 1.3x | 4.0x |
Seven formulas applied to what the company reported. None of them predicts a price — each answers what the stock would be worth if its assumption held. The assumption is printed next to every number, because it is the assumption that produces the result.
Square root of 22.5 × earnings × book value — the two ceilings Graham proposed. Blind to intangibles, so it undervalues software and brands.
This formula has no meaning here — usually a loss, negative cash flow, or a missing input.
Median P/E of 15.7 among peers in the sector.
Median P/E of 50.6 across the years on record for this company itself. Answers whether it is cheap against its own past, which a whole sector trading low cannot flatter.
Cash flow growing 5.0% a year for 10 years, discounted at 10%, then 2.5% forever.
Sector median of 9.5x operating profit, less net debt. Sees the business before its financing, so debt does not distort the comparison. Banks have no EBITDA — interest is their revenue, not a cost.
Companies of similar size in Communication Services, for comparison. The columns are the same ones above, in the same order.
| Stock | Price | P/E | P/B | Dividend yield | ROE | Market cap |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| NCMINational CineMedia, Inc. | $2.22 | — | 0.6x | 5.41% | -2.28% | $208.84M |
| ANGIAngi Inc. | $5.05 | — | 0.3x | — | -26.25% | $204.26M |
| GDEVGDEV Inc. | $10.87 | 2.6x | — | — | — | $197.3M |
| PLAYDave & Buster's Entertainment, Inc. | $6.62 |
Crexendo, Inc. provides cloud communication platform software and unified communications as a service in the United States and internationally. It operates through two segments, Cloud Telecommunications Services and Software Solutions. The company offers hardware, software, and unified internet protocol or cloud technology for businesses using user interfaces, such as a Crexendo branded and third party desktop phones and/or mobile and desktop applications; develop end user portals for account management, license management, billing and customer support, and adopt other cloud technologies; and sale and lease of cloud telecommunications equipment. It also provides unified communications, video conferencing, and collaboration and contact center solutions comprising SNAPsolution, an IP-based platform that provides a broad suite of unified communications services, including hosted Private Branch Exchange, auto-attendant, call center, conferencing, and mobility; and SNAPaccel, a software-as-a-service based software. In addition, the company offers subscription maintenance and support services; and professional services, including consulting, technical support, resident engineer, and design and installation services. The company was formerly known as iMergent, Inc. and changed its name to Crexendo, Inc. in May 2011. The company was incorporated in 1995 and is headquartered in Tempe, Arizona.
Company description provided by Yahoo Finance.
| 7.8x |
| 4.4x |
| 2.4x |
| P/B | 3.0x | 3.2x | 2.8x | 2.9x | 1.2x | 1.7x | 4.9x | 14.4x | 14.4x |
| EPS | $0.16 | $0.06 | -$0.01 | -$1.54 | -$0.12 | $0.46 | $0.07 | -$0.02 |
| Dividend yield | — | — | — | 0.10% | 1.05% | — | — | — | — |
| Profit margin | 1.04% | 7.44% | 2.76% | -0.68% | -94.30% | -8.70% | 48.45% | 7.89% | -1.87% |
| ROE | 1.23% | 7.95% | 3.26% | -0.81% | -85.42% | -3.71% | 30.82% | 25.96% | -11.15% |
Median, not average: a single year of near-zero profit produces a P/E of 400 and would drag an average on its own. P/E years above 200x are left out, the same cut the fair price uses — so this median matches the “its own history” method below. Price and EPS have no median: they are series that grow.
This formula has no meaning here — usually a loss, negative cash flow, or a missing input.
Not the average of the seven numbers above. Four of the seven start from the same earnings per share — Graham, Lynch, sector multiples and its own history — so averaging all seven would let one input count four times and drown out the others. Instead each family produces one number, and the fair price is the average of the families that answered. A family with two working formulas contributes their average, not two votes.
5 methods answered, across 3 families.
Every formula reads the same reported statements and they can be wrong together. The margin is room for that.
-35.5% from the average.
These are models, not forecasts, and not investment advice. Change one assumption and the number changes with it — that is a property of valuation, not a defect of this page.
| — |
| 2.6x |
| — |
| -69.74% |
| $230.58M |
| LEELEE ENTERPRISES, Inc | $8.37 | — | — | — | — | $186.58M |
| SLESuper League Enterprise, Inc. | $3.86 | 0.0x | 0.5x | — | -503.98% | $179.7M |