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Hour Loop, Inc
How the company evolved, year by year. Revenue and debt come from the annual reports — for most companies, the 10-K filings with the SEC since 2009; dividends from the payments themselves.
The bars are a balance on the closing date; the lines are what happened during the year. Revenue above equity is ordinary, not an anomaly — it means the company turns its capital over more than once a year.
Major managers that reported this stock in their latest 13F.
▼ -46.0% over 5Y.
This stock has less than 5 years of price history — the answer would measure a shorter period than the one asked for.
Dividends reinvested, splits accounted for. Past prices say what happened, not what will.
The last 4 closed years. Each multiple uses that year’s closing price and that year’s reported numbers — not today’s. The range is set by the annual reports on record.
| Indicator | Median | 2025 | 2024 | 2023 | 2022 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Year-end price | $1.80 | $2.25 | $1.38 | $2.61 | |
| P/E | — | 36.0x | 112.5x | — | — |
| P/S | 0.5x | 0.4x | 0.6x | 0.4x | 1.0x |
| P/B | 12.1x | 9.1x | 15.3x | 10.9x | 13.4x |
| EPS | $0.05 | $0.02 |
Seven formulas applied to what the company reported. None of them predicts a price — each answers what the stock would be worth if its assumption held. The assumption is printed next to every number, because it is the assumption that produces the result.
Square root of 22.5 × earnings × book value — the two ceilings Graham proposed. Blind to intangibles, so it undervalues software and brands.
This formula has no meaning here — usually a loss, negative cash flow, or a missing input.
Median P/E of 17.9 among peers in the sector.
This formula has no meaning here — usually a loss, negative cash flow, or a missing input.
Cash flow growing 5.0% a year for 10 years, discounted at 10%, then 2.5% forever.
Sector median of 9.8x operating profit, less net debt. Sees the business before its financing, so debt does not distort the comparison. Banks have no EBITDA — interest is their revenue, not a cost.
Companies of similar size in Consumer Cyclical, for comparison. The columns are the same ones above, in the same order.
| Stock | Price | P/E | P/B | Dividend yield | ROE | Market cap |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| YTRAYatra Online, Inc. | $1.00 | — | 1.1x | — | -1.67% | $63.99M |
| ROLRHigh Roller Technologies, Inc. | $5.97 | 39.8x | 2.2x | — | 1.46% | $65.84M |
| GRSDGRANDSTAND Ltd | $1.86 | — | 0.6x | — | -29.92% | $66.21M |
| LITBLightInTheBox Holding Co., Ltd. | $3.20 |
Hour Loop, Inc., an online retailer, engages in e-commerce retailing business in the United States. It sells products in various categories, including home/garden décor, toys, kitchenware, apparel, and electronics. The company sells its products through hourloop.com, as well as third-party marketplaces, including Amazon, Walmart, eBay, and Etsy. Hour Loop, Inc. was founded in 2013 and is headquartered in Redmond, Washington.
Company description provided by Yahoo Finance.
| -$0.07 |
| -$0.04 |
| Profit margin | -0.53% | 1.20% | 0.48% | -1.84% | -1.54% |
| ROE | -4.44% | 24.38% | 12.74% | -54.56% | -21.63% |
Median, not average: a single year of near-zero profit produces a P/E of 400 and would drag an average on its own. P/E years above 200x are left out, the same cut the fair price uses — so this median matches the “its own history” method below. Price and EPS have no median: they are series that grow.
This formula has no meaning here — usually a loss, negative cash flow, or a missing input.
Not the average of the seven numbers above. Four of the seven start from the same earnings per share — Graham, Lynch, sector multiples and its own history — so averaging all seven would let one input count four times and drown out the others. Instead each family produces one number, and the fair price is the average of the families that answered. A family with two working formulas contributes their average, not two votes.
4 methods answered, across 3 families.
Every formula reads the same reported statements and they can be wrong together. The margin is room for that.
-52.2% from the average.
These are models, not forecasts, and not investment advice. Change one assumption and the number changes with it — that is a property of valuation, not a defect of this page.
| 6.8x |
| — |
| — |
| — |
| $63.13M |
| GENKGEN Restaurant Group, Inc. | $1.91 | — | 0.8x | — | -96.66% | $62.96M |
| KNDIKandi Technologies Group, Inc. | $0.62 | — | 0.2x | — | -30.99% | $61.92M |