Bassett Furniture Industries Inc
How the company evolved, year by year. Revenue and debt come from the annual reports — for most companies, the 10-K filings with the SEC since 2009; dividends from the payments themselves.
The bars are a balance on the closing date; the lines are what happened during the year. Revenue above equity is ordinary, not an anomaly — it means the company turns its capital over more than once a year.
Major managers that reported this stock in their latest 13F.
▲ +8.2% over 5Y.
today you would have $1,362.44▲ +36.2%
Dividends reinvested, splits accounted for. Past prices say what happened, not what will.
The last 17 closed years. Each multiple uses that year’s closing price and that year’s reported numbers — not today’s. The range is set by the annual reports on record.
| Indicator | Median | 2025 | 2024 | 2023 | 2022 | 2021 | 2020 | 2019 | 2018 | 2017 | 2016 | 2015 | 2014 | 2013 | 2012 | 2011 | 2010 | 2009 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Year-end price | $16.76 | $13.83 | $16.60 | $17.38 | $16.77 | $20.08 | $16.68 | $20.04 | $37.60 | $30.40 | $25.08 | $19.51 | $15.28 | $12.47 | $7.49 | $4.20 | $3.48 | |
Seven formulas applied to what the company reported. None of them predicts a price — each answers what the stock would be worth if its assumption held. The assumption is printed next to every number, because it is the assumption that produces the result.
Square root of 22.5 × earnings × book value — the two ceilings Graham proposed. Blind to intangibles, so it undervalues software and brands.
Earnings growing 0.0% a year plus a 4.5% dividend — Lynch adds the yield to the growth rate, so a payer is not priced like a company that returns nothing. Growth capped at 25%.
Median P/E of 17.9 among peers in the sector.
Median P/E of 20.8 across the years on record for this company itself. Answers whether it is cheap against its own past, which a whole sector trading low cannot flatter.
Cash flow growing 5.0% a year for 10 years, discounted at 10%, then 2.5% forever.
Sector median of 9.8x operating profit, less net debt. Sees the business before its financing, so debt does not distort the comparison. Banks have no EBITDA — interest is their revenue, not a cost.
Companies of similar size in Consumer Cyclical, for comparison. The columns are the same ones above, in the same order.
| Stock | Price | P/E | P/B | Dividend yield | ROE | Market cap |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| HTLMHomesToLife Ltd | $1.72 | 9.0x | 5.0x | — | 83.91% | $153.81M |
| CAASChina Automotive Systems, Inc. | $4.99 | 2.6x | 0.3x | — | 14.72% | $150.55M |
| COOKTraeger, Inc. | $55.86 | — | 0.9x | — | -51.03% | $156.31M |
| INSEInspired Entertainment, Inc. | $5.93 |
Bassett Furniture Industries, Incorporated, together with its subsidiaries, designs, manufactures, sources, distributes, and retails home furnishings and furniture products in the United States. It operates through two segments, Wholesale and RetailCompany-Owned Stores. The company offers sofas, chairs, reclining furniture, ottomans and benches, and leather furniture; tables and cabinets; dining and outdoor furniture; beds, dressers and chests, nightstands and bedside tables, mattresses and bases, duvet covers and inserts, quilts and coverlets, sheets and pillowcases, shams and pillow inserts, accent pillows, and throws; office chairs, desks, and storages; home decor products, lighting, wall decor, mirrors, cabinet hardware, and cutting boards; and rugs. It is also involved in wood and upholstery operations. The company sells its products through a network of company-owned and licensee-owned stores under the Bassett Home Furnishings name; and independent retailers; multi-line furniture stores, including Bassett galleries or design centers; and online. Bassett Furniture Industries, Incorporated was founded in 1902 and is based in Bassett, Virginia.
Company description provided by Yahoo Finance.
| P/E |
| 20.8x |
| 23.9x |
| — |
| — |
| 2.5x |
| 9.2x |
| — |
| — |
| 26.0x |
| 22.1x |
| 20.8x |
| 13.3x |
| 22.4x |
| 32.5x |
| 5.2x |
| 1.6x |
| — |
| — |
| P/S | 0.4x | 0.4x | 0.4x | 0.4x | 0.3x | 0.4x | 0.6x | 0.4x | 0.5x | 0.9x | 0.8x | 0.6x | 0.6x | 0.5x | 0.5x | 0.3x | 0.2x | — |
| P/B | 1.0x | 0.9x | 0.7x | 0.8x | 0.8x | 1.0x | 1.3x | 0.9x | 1.1x | 2.1x | 1.8x | 1.5x | 1.3x | 1.1x | 0.9x | 0.6x | 0.5x | — |
| EPS | $0.70 | -$1.11 | -$0.36 | $6.95 | $1.83 | -$1.04 | -$0.19 | $0.77 | $1.70 | $1.46 | $1.88 | $0.87 | $0.47 | $2.41 | $4.79 | -$0.17 | -$1.99 |
| Dividend yield | 3.16% | 4.77% | 5.50% | 4.10% | 12.08% | 3.16% | 3.51% | 3.00% | 2.35% | 2.05% | 2.24% | 2.15% | 2.46% | 2.75% | 11.63% | 7.94% | — | — |
| Payout | 46.58% | 114.29% | — | — | 30.22% | 28.96% | — | — | 61.04% | 45.29% | 46.58% | 28.72% | 55.17% | 89.36% | 60.17% | 12.42% | — | — |
| Profit margin | 1.82% | 1.82% | -2.94% | -0.81% | 13.46% | 4.19% | -3.09% | -0.43% | 1.80% | 4.03% | 3.66% | 4.74% | 2.73% | 1.59% | 9.91% | 21.86% | -0.85% | -9.75% |
| ROE | 4.32% | 3.69% | -5.79% | -1.73% | 33.41% | 11.09% | -6.59% | -1.08% | 4.32% | 9.54% | 8.76% | 11.52% | 5.93% | 3.24% | 16.98% | 36.31% | -1.88% | -20.57% |
Median, not average: a single year of near-zero profit produces a P/E of 400 and would drag an average on its own. P/E years above 200x are left out, the same cut the fair price uses — so this median matches the “its own history” method below. Price and EPS have no median: they are series that grow.
Dividend growing 0.0% a year against a 7.7% required return, taken from the stock’s beta. The only method anchored on what the company pays rather than what it reports.
Not the average of the seven numbers above. Four of the seven start from the same earnings per share — Graham, Lynch, sector multiples and its own history — so averaging all seven would let one input count four times and drown out the others. Instead each family produces one number, and the fair price is the average of the families that answered. A family with two working formulas contributes their average, not two votes.
7 methods answered, across 4 families.
Every formula reads the same reported statements and they can be wrong together. The margin is room for that.
-4.9% from the average.
These are models, not forecasts, and not investment advice. Change one assumption and the number changes with it — that is a property of valuation, not a defect of this page.
| — |
| — |
| — |
| — |
| $158.18M |
| DLTHDuluth Holdings Inc | $4.18 | 24.6x | 0.9x | — | 3.56% | $158.86M |
| RRGBRed Robin Gourmet Burgers Inc | $7.73 | — | — | — | — | $146.13M |